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Executive Summary 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) oversees countless criminal and civil investigations on behalf 
of the federal government. Perhaps the most contentious and fraught are investigations that 
implicate the president or other high-ranking executive branch officials. As the president is the 
most senior official charged with ensuring that the “laws be faithfully executed,” these 
situations almost invariably create actual or perceived conflicts of interest for investigators. 
When the highest levels of the executive branch are compromised, political motivations can 
impede meritorious investigations, especially when DOJ personnel are implicated. If high 
ranking prosecutors or even the attorney general are suspected of illegality, it is inapposite to 
the notion of an impartial investigation to allow them to influence the process. 
To protect the integrity of investigations into high-level officials, the executive branch utilizes 
special counsels. These individuals are experienced attorneys, brought in from outside the 
government and empowered with authority and resources to conduct specific investigations. 
Procedures related to special counsel investigations evolved over time. The title of the 
attorneys who conducted the investigations also changed—from special prosecutor to 
independent counsel to special counsel. Initially, the process for conducting the investigations 
was informal. Presidents would appoint special prosecutors largely as a show of good faith and 
to demonstrate that they were taking allegations of corruption seriously. Without formal 
standards, there was nothing to prevent these investigations from being cut short if the 
prosecutor proved too effective at rooting out misconduct within the government. 
President Richard Nixon’s firing in 1973 of the special prosecutor investigating the Watergate 
scandal prompted Congress to pass a law outlining the rules and procedures for the 
investigations. The Ethics in Government Act allowed the attorney general to request a Special 
Division of federal judges to appoint an independent counsel to conduct an investigation. The 
DOJ utilized independent counsels to carry out several high-profile investigations, including the 
inquiry into the Iran-Contra Affair, which involved the Reagan administration’s use of proceeds 
from arms sales to Iran to fund rebels opposing Nicaragua’s socialist government. When the 
constitutionality of the Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel provisions was 
challenged in Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as valid under the 
Appointments Clause. 
After former federal judge Kenneth Starr’s independent counsel investigation into President 
William Clinton reached far beyond its original focus, many in Congress came to believe the 
independent counsel law did not place sufficient checks on investigators. As a result, Congress 
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granting the attorney general authority to appoint special prosecutors, renamed “special 
counsels.” 
The most recent investigation under these regulations was Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s 
inquiry into Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election. The investigation, which faced 
constant public criticism from President Donald Trump, produced indictments of several Trump 
campaign officials. But the extensive report issued by Mueller’s office stated that there was 
insufficient evidence to support criminal charges based on the Trump campaign coordinating 
with the Russian efforts against the election. Additionally, the report declined to reach a 
conclusion on whether Trump committed obstruction of justice by attempting to thwart 
Mueller’s probe. Mueller submitted his report to Attorney General William Barr in accordance 
with DOJ regulations. Several weeks later, the DOJ released a redacted version of the report to 
the public. Barr released a summary of the report just days after receiving it that many, 
including Mueller, felt mischaracterized the report to make the investigation’s findings appear 
more favorable to Trump. 
The Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel provisions and the DOJ’s special counsel 
regulation have both faced criticism. Under the Ethics in Government Act, an independent 
counsel had such significant autonomy that lawmakers feared an unaccountable “runaway 
prosecutor.” By contrast, observers of the Mueller investigation felt that the investigation was 
handcuffed, particularly in regards to the reporting and public release of its findings. 
Our recommendations for improving special counsel investigations seek to draw on elements of 
both systems to balance the competing interests of prosecutorial independence and 
accountability. We conclude that the country would be best served through a return to 
legislation codifying specific procedures encompassing all phases of a special counsel 
investigation. 
1. Pre-Appointment: The attorney general should be responsible for conducting a 
preliminary investigation to determine if allegations are sufficient to warrant 
appointment of a special counsel. The DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility should 
have an affirmative responsibility to continuously evaluate whether the attorney 
general has potential conflicts of interest that would require an ethics consultation. To 
prevent the attorney general from failing to appoint a special counsel when necessary, 
we recommend two measures. First, the attorney general should be required to appoint 
a special counsel whenever certain high-ranking executive officers, such as the 
president, vice president, and Cabinet secretaries, are suspected of committing a crime 
or become the “subject” of an investigation. Second, Congress should be able to petition 
the attorney general to evaluate whether a special counsel investigation is necessary. 
2. Appointment: A special counsel should be appointed by a Special Division of the federal 
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appointment should be based on a recommendation from the attorney general. If the 
Special Division rejects the attorney general’s proposed special counsel, the attorney 
general should be able to propose another candidate. 
3. Scope: The scope of a special counsel’s investigation should be subject to approval from 
the Special Division judges. At the same time that the Special Division approved a special 
counsel’s appointment, it would provide the special counsel with the scope of the 
investigation. Changes to the scope would require approval from the Special Division. 
The attorney general could refer matters in the special counsel’s ambit back to the DOJ, 
but the Special Division could reverse any of those referrals. The special counsel would 
have discretion to refer matters out of his or her office to the DOJ. This oversight of the 
special counsel’s scope would prevent overly expansive investigations, while protecting 
against the possibility that the attorney general might undermine the investigation by 
limiting its range. 
4. Oversight: The attorney general should have primary oversight of special counsel 
investigations because the attorney general is better positioned than the courts or 
Congress to make decisions about federal criminal investigations. To prevent 
interference, the attorney general should be required to report to Congress whenever 
he or she prevents the special counsel from taking any investigative or prosecutorial 
step. Additionally, the special counsel’s budget should be periodically reported to 
Congress.  
5. Removal: Although the power to remove a special counsel should be exercised 
sparingly, it has historically been vested and should remain with the attorney general. 
But removal must be “for cause,” as defined in the current DOJ special counsel 
regulations. The law should require the attorney general to submit a petition to remove 
a special counsel to the Special Division for review to ensure that the “for cause” 
standard is met.  
6. Termination: When an investigation has reached a conclusion, the special counsel or 
attorney general should have authority to formally terminate the investigation. The 
Special Division should review a termination decision by the attorney general, but 
should only withhold approval in extreme circumstances, such as when it is clear that 
the attorney general is ending the investigation to obstruct it. Although it is important 
to prevent “runaway” investigations, it is impractical to impose formal timelines or end 
dates on investigations. 
7. Release of Findings: At the close of an investigation, a special counsel should submit a 
report to Congress on the investigation’s findings. The report should make a clear 
statement as to whether the special counsel believes the subjects of the investigation 
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public as much of the report as possible. Ensuring that the special counsel’s findings are 
released with minimal interference recognizes that members of the executive branch 
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Introduction 
At the Constitutional Convention, the framers vested power in the executive branch to ensure 
the faithful execution of the laws, but they did not fully address how to handle the conflicts 
interest that might emerge when the laws needed to be enforced against executive branch 
officials. Over time, it became apparent that further protection was necessary to ensure that 
the laws were applied equally, and, in 1875, the first special counsel (then called a “special 
prosecutor”) was appointed to conduct an investigation of executive branch officials. Special 
counsel investigations have since become an indispensable tool for rooting out corruption and 
restoring the public’s confidence in government.  
But special counsel investigations and the rules for conducting them have not been without 
flaws. At times, the investigations have suffered deliberate attempts, including by the 
president, to undermine them. Other times, special counsels have drawn criticism for 
conducting excessively costly investigations without appropriate restraint.  
This report examines past special counsel investigations and recommends a law with 
procedures for future investigations that achieves a balance between independence and 
accountability. The report begins with a history of significant previous special counsel 
investigations. Next, the report analyzes each phase of a special counsel investigation, 
discussing the approaches under the Ethics in Government Act and the current Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) regulations and presenting our recommendations for reforming the rules to help 
ensure that the special counsel is protected from undue influence, but not over-empowered.   
I. History 
Special counsel investigations have scrutinized the executive branch since 1875. The 
investigation of the Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration was a significant force 
in ending Nixon’s presidency and led Congress to pass a law governing future investigations. But 
the procedures in that law were ultimately abandoned by Congress after the independent 
counsel investigation during the Clinton administration raised concerns that the law gave 
investigators too much autonomy. The DOJ subsequently created regulations for conducting 
the investigations, and those regulations guided the most recent special counsel investigation: 
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 Early History 
The early history of special counsel investigations began in 1875 during President Ulysses S. 
Grant’s administration and continued into Harry S. Truman’s presidency in the 1950s. 
1. President Ulysses S. Grant (Whiskey Ring Scandal) 
In 1875, Secretary of the Treasury Benjamin Bristow began an anti-corruption campaign that 
resulted in his agents uncovering “whiskey rings” in cities throughout the United States.1 
Government officials tasked with collecting taxes and whiskey producers underreported the 
production of whiskey in order to pay less federal tax and divided excess financial gains among 
themselves.2 This fraud cost the federal government millions of dollars in lost revenue.3  
In May 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant, then in his second term, appointed former Senator 
John B. Henderson, a man known for his political independence, to prosecute the whiskey ring 
participants.4 Henderson was the first special prosecutor appointed to investigate individuals 
within the executive branch.5 His investigation quickly began to implicate high-level executive 
branch officials, including Revenue Supervisor John McDonald.6 However, when Orville 
Babcock, President Grant’s close friend and private secretary, became a target, Grant found 
scrutiny of Babcock to be “unwarranted” and suspected that political enemies were using it to 
“further discredit the Grant administration.”7 As a result, Grant fired Henderson in December 
1875, only seven months into his investigation.8 Grant easily removed Henderson. There were 
no laws or regulations that limited his discretion; the special prosecutor served purely at the 
pleasure of the president.9 Henderson’s removal did not put an end to Grant’s troubles. 
Secretary Bristow continued investigating, and, although Babcock was acquitted, others, 





1 See GERALD S. GREENBERG, HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS 163 (2000); Jennifer 
Rose Hopper, Reexamining the Nineteenth-Century Presidency and Partisan Press: The Case of President Grant and 
the Whiskey Ring Scandal, 42 SOC. SCI. HIST. 109, 115 (2018). 
2 Hopper, supra note 1, at 115. 
3 Id. 
4 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 147, 163. 
5 Id. at 147. 
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2. President Theodore Roosevelt (Oregon Land Fraud Scandal & Post Office 
Scandal) 
During President Theodore Roosevelt’s tenure in office, special prosecutors were appointed for 
two separate investigations: the Oregon Land Fraud Scandal and the Post Office Scandal. The 
land fraud scandal centered around a stretch of public land from Portland to California that the 
federal government and state of Oregon had granted to railroad companies.11 Congress had 
passed a law allowing land around the new railroad to be sold to homestead farmers for very 
low prices to stimulate settlement and growth.12 However, the land was not well-suited to 
homestead farming; it was best adapted to ventures like raising cattle and lumbering.13 So, 
state and federal officials, including members of the Department of the Interior, conspired to 
fraudulently sell the land to people and companies seeking to use it for commercial purposes.14  
U.S. Attorney John H. Hall was initially tasked with investigating the scheme. Other prosecutors 
had expedited the fraudulent land claims, but Hall did not.15 As a result, in 1903, Attorney 
General Philander Knox appointed a special prosecutor, Francis J. Heney, to take over the 
investigation.16 Throughout the investigation, Heney’s willingness to aggressively pursue those 
in power led some to push for his removal. Despite the pressure, Roosevelt continued to 
support Heney’s independence.17 Heney’s investigation lasted seven years and culminated in 
convictions against several individuals, including U.S. Attorney Hall, Congressman Binger 
Hermann, Congressman John N. Williamson, and Senator John H. Mitchell.18 
President Roosevelt appointed another special prosecutor, Charles J. Bonaparte, to investigate 
corruption in the Post Office.19 Bonaparte’s appointment came in 1903 after Assistant Attorney 
General John N. Tyner’s resignation. Tyner had been charged with destroying documents linked 
to the investigation.20 After concluding his investigation, Bonaparte suggested reforms to the 
Post Office and led prosecutions against Tyner, Postmaster General Charles Emory Smith, and 
First Assistant Postmaster General Perry S. Heath.21 Though the prosecutions were mostly 




11 Michael C. Blumm & Tim Wigington, The Oregon & California Railroad Grant Lands’ Sordid Past, Contentious 
Present, and Uncertain Future: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 8, 12 (2013). 
12 John Messing, Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials, 1903-1910, 35 PAC. HIST. 
REV. 35, 35 (1966). 
13 Id. at 36. 
14 Id. at 35; Giancarlo Panagia, The Political History of Federal Land Exchanges, ELECTRONIC GREEN J., no. 28, Spring 
2009. 
15 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 164-65; Messing, supra note 12, at 43-44. 
16 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 165. 
17 Id. at 290. 
18 Id. at 165-66. 
19 Id. at 290. 
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recommendations, led to substantive changes to the formerly corrupt agency.22 In 1906, 
Roosevelt appointed Bonaparte to be attorney general.23 
Although no statutes or regulations limited Roosevelt’s authority over the special prosecutors 
appointed during his term, he supported their efforts and allowed them the independence they 
needed to effectively carry out their work.24 Roosevelt’s own initiatives had spawned the 
investigations, but he was a passionate advocate for government reform.25 As a result, these 
inquiries did not evoke the same apparent ire as other investigations where the president’s 
actions, personal life, or close associates came under suspicion. 
3. President Calvin Coolidge (Teapot Dome Scandal) 
The misconduct in the Teapot Dome Scandal took place during President Warren Harding’s 
administration, but the responsibility to investigate it fell to President Calvin Coolidge, who 
assumed office after Harding’s death in 1923.26 In the early 1900s, the Navy Department 
controlled certain oil reserves.27 In 1921, at the behest of Interior Secretary Albert Fall, 
President Harding issued an executive order transferring two vast naval oil reserves, Teapot 
Dome and Elk Hills, from the Navy to the Interior Department.28 Once the transfer was 
complete, Fall covertly leased both to oil companies.29 When President Coolidge took office, the 
transactions had become a scandal. Media attention, congressional hearings, and accusations 
of a DOJ cover-up forced Coolidge to take action.30 He appointed two special prosecutors, one 
from each major political party. Coolidge nominated Republican lawyer Owen Roberts and 
former Democratic Senator Atlee Pomerene for Senate confirmation.31 Pomerene and Roberts 
were confirmed in February 1924, the only time the Senate has confirmed any special 
prosecutor.32 The investigation led to the conviction of Secretary Fall for bribery and the 
cancelation of the leases he brokered.33 During the investigation, a special committee found 
that Attorney General Harry Daugherty had not adequately handled the case, and he was 




22 See id. at 28-29. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 291. 
25 Id. at 289-90. 
26 Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 2307, 2314 (1998).  
27 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 75. 
28 Id. at 87, 158-59. 
29 Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2315. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 2316. 
32 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 276. 
33 Id.; Gary D. Libecap, The Political Allocation of Mineral Rights: A Re-Evaluation of Teapot, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 381, 
382 (1984). 
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The Teapot Dome Scandal demonstrated that public outcry and fear of congressional action can 
force the executive branch’s hand. The scandal also showed that congressional involvement in 
the appointment of special prosecutors can improve Congress’s confidence in an investigation 
and prevent it from taking more drastic actions to investigate. Additionally, congressional 
confirmation forced Coolidge to carefully consider his nominees. In fact, his first two nominees 
were not confirmed after their oil industry connections were revealed.35 
4. President Harry S. Truman (Bureau of Internal Revenue Scandal) 
Three decades after the Teapot Dome Scandal, President Harry Truman appointed a special 
prosecutor to investigate allegations of misconduct within the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 
Before there was any suggestion of appointing a special prosecutor, an in-depth congressional 
investigation, a series of prosecutions and convictions, and personnel changes were already 
underway.36 To appease Congress, the public, and the media, Truman believed it was necessary 
to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate corruption within his administration.37 Initially, 
Truman planned to entrust the investigation to a three-person team of special prosecutors, 
consisting of Alger Hiss, clergyman Daniel Poling, and Judge Thomas F. Murphy.38 This plan 
quickly fell apart. Murphy withdrew and, soon after, Poling resigned.39 
Truman then tasked Attorney General J. Howard McGrath with selecting a special prosecutor. 
In February 1952, McGrath appointed Newbold Morris as the special prosecutor charged with 
investigating the Bureau of Internal Revenue.40 Morris previously worked with New York Mayor 
Fiorello La Guardia and was known for being “an irrepressible reformer.”41 Despite this 
reputation, Morris had a brief and ineffective tenure as a special prosecutor.42 After Congress 
denied him subpoena powers, Morris searched for alternative methods to conduct his 
investigation.43 He decided to create a questionnaire that would collect detailed information 
about the income and spending of federal government employees to determine whether their 
spending matched their income.44 But Morris drew the ire of Attorney General McGrath by 




35 Id. at 276. 
36 Id. at 334. 
37 Id.; see also Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2316. 
38 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 232. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 231-32. 
41 Id. at 232; The Administration: Exits and Entrances, TIME MAG. (Apr. 14, 1952), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857104,00.html. 
42 GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 232-33.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 232-33. 
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McGrath objected to Morris’s “aggressive approach” and fired him in April 1952.46 In response 
to Morris’s dismal, President Truman fired McGrath.47 Though another special prosecutor for 
this matter was never appointed, those responsible for corruption within the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue were brought to justice through standard prosecutions.48 
 Watergate Through the Ethics in Government Act 
The special prosecutor investigation into the Watergate Scandal reached previously unseen 
levels of prominence and importance. Shortly after Elliot Richardson’s appointment as attorney 
general in 1973, he named Archibald Cox as special prosecutor to investigate the spiraling 
Watergate scandal.49 Despite White House denials of any involvement in a break-in at the 
Democratic National Committee’s offices, the investigation into the incident had drawn 
progressively closer to the Oval Office.50 Testimony at congressional hearings had implicated 
Nixon’s top aides and suggested that the White House had deliberately acted to minimize 
backlash from the investigation. Nixon had responded by asking for the resignation of the 
attorney general and White House counsel and by nominating Richardson as the new attorney 
general.51 During his confirmation hearings, Richardson had announced that he would appoint a 
special prosecutor and not interfere with the ensuing investigations.52 Cox’s appointment soon 
sparked unprecedented conflict in the executive branch. 
The dispute began when former White House Counsel John Dean told prosecutors and 
Congress that he believed conversations in the Oval Office were being taped.53 Following the 
testimony of Dean and others, the significance of Nixon’s recording system became clear. Cox 
served a subpoena on Nixon for the tapes. When Nixon refused to comply, Cox secured a court 
order directing him to produce the tapes. Nixon challenged the order, arguing that the tapes 




46 Id. at 222, 233. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 346. 
49 Id. at 286. 
50 See Heidi Kitrosser, What If Daniel Ellsberg Hadn’t Bothered?, 45 IND. L. REV. 89, 101-02 (2011). See also McCord 
Declares That Mrs. Mitchell Was Forcibly Held, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1975), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/19/archives/mccord-declares-that-mrs-mitchell-was-forcibly-held-comment-
from.html.  
51 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 64 (1997). 
52 Id.; WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE REPORT 172 (1975); see Anthony 
Ripley, Senate Speedily Confirms Richardson by 82—3 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/24/archives/senate-speedily-confirms-richardson-by-823-vote-
richardson.html. 
53 See Samuel Dash, Congress’ Spotlight on the Watergate Hearings, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1719, 1732-35 (1994). 
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rejected Nixon’s argument, and ordered that the tapes be produced or submitted to the court 
for in camera review.55 
Instead of complying, Nixon proposed releasing summaries of the tapes to be verified by a 
chosen senator, and called on Cox to “cease all further attempts to obtain Presidential 
materials through the courts.”56 Cox refused, and, on October 20, Nixon ordered Richardson to 
fire him. Rather than carry out the order, Richardson resigned in protest, followed quickly by 
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, in what the press dubbed the “Saturday Night 
Massacre.” The order fell to the next most senior DOJ official, Solicitor General Robert Bork, 
who, at last, dismissed Cox.57 If Nixon experienced any reprieve, it was short-lived. Public outcry 
was tremendous, and the press demanded the appointment of another special prosecutor.58 
On November 1, only 12 days after Cox’s firing, Bork, with Nixon’s approval, appointed Leon 
Jaworski as special prosecutor to resume the investigation.59   
In early 1974, Jaworski issued a subpoena for the same tapes that cost Cox his position. This 
time, under considerable public pressure, Nixon released edited transcripts of a select number 
of tapes and moved to have the D.C. District Court quash the subpoena.60 The district court 
again rejected Nixon’s assertion of executive privilege, and ordered him to comply with 
Jaworski’s subpoena.61 The case went directly to the Supreme Court.62 The Court’s decision in 
the landmark case, U.S. v. Nixon, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, considered the limits 
of executive privilege at length. The Court upheld the district court’s ruling, asserting that 
executive privilege does not allow the president to withhold evidence that is relevant to a 





55 In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, *14 (D.D.C. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
56 John M. Crewdson, Richardson Quits Over Order on Cox, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/21/archives/richardson-quits-over-order-on-cox-attorney-general-says-he-
couldnt.html; Don Bivens, Watergate Inspires After 40 Years, 40 LITIG. 4, 4 (2014). 
57 Bivens, supra note 56, at 5. 
58 Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitutional 
Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12-13 (1987). 
59 Anthony Ripley, Jaworski Assumes Office; Bork Praises Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/11/06/archives/jaworski-assumes-office-bork-praises-prosecutor-8-to-be-
consulted.html. 
60 United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328, 1330 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974). 
61 Id. at 1331. 
62 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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Another Watergate era test of presidential powers came from a lawsuit challenging Cox’s 
firing.64 Although Jaworski had already been appointed, the D.C. District Court, in Nader v. Bork, 
stated that it was important to address the legality of Cox’s dismissal to “give guidance for 
future conduct with regard to the Watergate inquiry.”65 The court held that firing Cox was 
illegal because he had not engaged in the extraordinary impropriety required by DOJ 
regulations.66 The decision was later vacated after U.S. v. Nixon was decided, but the case 
provided a platform for the court to admonish Nixon and his administration for dismissing 
Cox.67 
The Watergate investigation changed the way the public and politicians viewed the nature and 
purpose of special prosecutor investigations. Previously, appointment of a special prosecutor 
was a tool the president used to ensure that the executive branch could objectively investigate 
its own officials. After Watergate, the special prosecutor served the pursuit of justice even if it 
meant pursuing the president. Nixon’s brazen attempts to undermine the efforts of the special 
prosecutor convinced Congress to focus on special prosecutors’ role. If they were to be the 
nation’s instrument for fighting high-level corruption, lawmakers thought additional protection 
was needed to insulate the position from the president and other executive branch officials. 
On October 26, 1978, almost five years to the date of Cox’s dismissal, President Jimmy Carter 
signed into law the Ethics in Government Act, which, among other government ethics reforms, 
created procedures for conducting independent counsel investigations.68 In addition to creating 
the new “independent counsel” title, the law provided more robust protections against 
removal. The law also set out circumstances that would require the attorney general to appoint 
an independent counsel and required a more intensive confirmation process.69 In the aftermath 
of Watergate, Congress sought to create an office that could withstand the type of 
underhanded methods observed during the Nixon administration, and, in doing so, established 
a position with near-limitless discretion and limited checks on its authority. But the debate over 
the office of independent counsel was far from over.  
 Post-Watergate Investigations Under the Ethics in Government Act 
Approximately 20 independent counsels were appointed under the Ethics in Government Act of 




64 See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) 
65 Id. at 106. 
66 Id. at 108. 
67 Nader v. Levi, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16791 (D.D.C. 1975). 
68 Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 604, 608-09 (1998). 
69 See Adrianne C. Blake, You’re Fired! Special Counsel Removal Authority and the Separation of Powers, 48 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 93, 100 (2018). 
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beginning during President Ronald Reagan’s second term in 1986, was an investigation of high-
ranking executive branch officials as part of what is commonly known as the Iran-Contra 
affair.71 Lawrence E. Walsh72 was appointed independent counsel to investigate a sale of arms 
to Iran in violation of an embargo and the subsequent diversion of the proceeds to support the 
right-wing rebel groups in Nicaragua known as the Contras.73 The investigation resulted in 
criminal charges against 14 individuals and several convictions, including of former Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs John Poindexter and former National Security Council 
staffer Oliver North.74 But these convictions were ultimately overturned, as Walsh’s 
investigation and subsequent prosecutions were met with fierce opposition. 
Critics chided Walsh for a variety of alleged missteps, such as the exorbitant cost of the 
investigation and prosecutions.75 Over six years, the government spent $35 million, prompting 
public backlash.76 The legacy of the Iran-Contra affair “will likely be lost in the tumultuousness 
of the time and extravagance of this amount.”77 However, not all were opposed to Walsh’s 
investigation. In 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno testified regarding the reauthorization of 
the independent counsel statute, stating, “The Iran-Contra investigation, far from providing 
support for doing away with the Act, proves its necessity . . . [T]his investigation could not have 
been conducted under the supervision of the Attorney General and concluded with any public 
confidence in its thoroughness or impartiality.”78  
The 1994 investigation of then-Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy garnered similar criticism. 
Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz investigated allegations that Espy accepted improper gifts, 
including sports tickets, lodging, and airfare.79 The investigation lasted four years and cost over 
$20 million.80 Smaltz’s office charged 13 individuals and six businesses with crimes, and 14 were 




71 Id. at 2339. 
72 Walsh, Lawrence Edward, FED. JUD. CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/walsh-lawrence-edward. 
73 The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Nov. 24, 2006), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210. 
74 UNDERSTANDING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, 
https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/overview.pdf. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 562 (1993). 
75 Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2358.  
76 Lawrence E. Walsh, The Need for Renewal of the Independent Counsel Act, 86 GEO L.J. 2379, 2384 n.12 (1998).  
77 Smaltz, supra note 26, at 2358-59. 
78 The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 24 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 103d Cong. 11 (1993) (statement of Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States).  
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The next notable investigation began in 1994, when Kenneth Star was appointed independent 
counsel to investigate financial transactions involving President William Clinton and First Lady 
Hillary Clinton. Specifically, Starr probed the relationship between the Clintons and a series of 
purportedly fraudulent loans and real estate investments surrounding the Whitewater 
Development Corporation and other entities.82 The investigation led to several criminal 
charges, but none against the president or first lady.83 Although the Whitewater allegations 
served as the impetus for the investigation, they would ultimately have little to do with its 
legacy.  
Starr’s eventual report led to Clinton’s impeachment.84 The investigation into the failed 
Arkansas land deal had already concluded when the judges overseeing Starr’s investigation 
assigned his office to investigate allegations that Clinton perjured himself during a deposition in 
Clinton v. Jones, a sexual harassment lawsuit against Clinton.85 The ensuing investigation 
confirmed that Clinton had engaged a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinski, a White House 
intern. Drawing on Starr’s report to Congress, the House of Representatives impeached Clinton 
for perjury and obstruction of justice based on Clinton’s statements under oath about the 
relationship and his other alleged actions to cover it up. The Senate acquitted Clinton on both 
articles of impeachment.86 
Starr has subsequently commented that there should have been another independent counsel 
to take on the Lewinsky investigation, but the only practical option was for his office to handle 
it given the lack of time and political appetite for another independent counsel.87 Even though 
Starr had recommended that his team take on the additional inquiry, he now asserts that “the 
most fundamental thing that could have been done differently” would have been for the 
Lewinsky matter to be investigated by others.88 
Although many found Clinton’s actions reproachable, others were equally outraged that the 




82 ROBERT WILLIAMS, POLITICAL SCANDALS IN THE USA 64-66 (1998); Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: 
Starr’s OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 641 (1999). 
83 ROBERT RAY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION 155 app. 5 (2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-ICREPORT-MADISON/content-detail.html. 
84 CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, 
APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 25 (2019). 
85 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).  
86 See David A. Graham & Cullen Murphy, The Clinton Impeachment, as Told by the People Who Lived It, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/clinton-impeachment/573940/. 
87 Firing Line: Ken Starr (PBS television broadcast Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/video/ken-starr-qu5cvx/. 
88 Starr Regrets Lead Role in Clinton Investigation, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 4, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
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Indeed, Starr’s investigation received extensive criticism for its expansive jurisdiction, and many 
alleged that it lacked appropriate restraint.89 
Each investigation under the Ethics and Government Act elicited criticism and sparked fierce 
debate over the Act’s continued existence. The investigations faced criticisms from members of 
Congress and the public for exceeding their authority, either through unjustified expenditures 
of resources or overly expansive inquiries. It appeared to many that an independent counsel 
could keep investigating and spending without limit until some sort of wrongdoing was 
uncovered. Following the Iran-Contra and Whitewater investigations, debate intensified over 
the scope, cost, and value of these investigations. Ultimately, Congress allowed the 
independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act to expire in 1999 with 
bipartisan support, marking the end of statutory law governing special counsel investigations to 
this day.90  
 The Modern Special Counsel Office  
To fill the void left by the expiration of the independent counsel law, the DOJ promulgated new 
regulations in 1999.91 The rules gave the attorney general authority to appoint special counsels 
without seeking confirmation from a panel of judges, which the Ethics in Government Act had 
required.92 Although the appointee would no longer be referred to as an independent counsel, 
a special counsel would serve the same role: to conduct investigations that pose conflicts of 
interest for the DOJ.93 Taking into consideration the concerns that led to the expiration of the 
Ethics in Government Act, special counsels have less autonomy than independent counsels. 
Specifically, the attorney general (or deputy attorney general in the event of a recusal) oversees 
the investigations and has the authority to appoint and remove special counsels.94 Because 
these regulations were not promulgated pursuant to the notice-and-comment process outlined 
in the Administrative Procedure Act,95 the DOJ can unilaterally rescind them at any time,96 and 




89 See Susan Schmidt & Dan Morgan, Hearings to Reveal Man Behind Curtain, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/starr111998.htm. See also Lanny J. 
Davis, Did Starr Set a Perjury Trap? A Series of Questionable Events Brings Attention to What Starr Knew and When 
He Knew It in the Clinton Investigation, BALT. SUN (Nov. 1, 1998), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-
1998-11-01-1998305008-story.html. 
90 BROWN & COLE, supra note 84. 
91 See 28 C.F.R. § 600 (1999). 
92 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (1999); BROWN & COLE, supra note 84, 4-6. 
93 James K. Robinson, After the Independent Counsel Act: Where Do We Go from Here?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 735 
(2000). 
94 28 C.F.R. § 600.7 (1999). 
95 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
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The most recent special counsel investigation occurred in the wake of the 2016 election of 
President Donald Trump. Throughout the campaign, the Trump campaign’s connections to 
Russia and its election interference efforts were a frequent subject of speculation.97 In the early 
months of the Trump administration, FBI Director James Comey revealed that the FBI had 
opened an investigation before the election into the campaign’s ties to Russia.98 During the 
investigation, Trump purportedly pressured Comey to cease the investigation of Michael Flynn, 
the national security advisor and one of Trump’s most visible supporters during the campaign.99 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions recused himself from overseeing the investigations into Russian 
campaign interference due to his work for the Trump campaign. Supervision of the 
investigations fell to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.100 Trump fired Comey on May 9, 
2017,101 and, as public outcry reached a crescendo in the following week, Rosenstein appointed 
Robert Mueller to serve as special counsel.102 Mueller’s mandate included the authority to 
investigate “any links and/or coordination” between the Russian government and the Trump 
campaign as well as “matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation.”103 
Rosenstein’s selection of Mueller was met with widespread approval.104 A former FBI director, 
Mueller was highly respected by Republicans and Democrats alike. Initially appointed FBI 
director by President George W. Bush, President Barack Obama had taken the unusual step of 




97 Trump fed into this controversy when he appeared to publicly ask Russia to hack opponent Hillary Clinton’s 
email server, although he later claimed that he was “joking.” Marshall Cohen, Trump Says He Joked About Wanting 
Russian Help in 2016. The Facts Tell a Different Story., CNN (Mar. 5, 2019, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/05/politics/trump-emails-joke/index.html. 
98 Russell Berman, It’s Official: The FBI Is Investigating Trump’s Links to Russia, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:46 PM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/its-official-the-fbi-is-investigating-trumps-links-to-
russia/520134/. 
99 Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trump-flynn-russia-investigation.html. 
100 Steven Harper, A Timeline: Everything We Know About the Comey Firing, BILL MOYERS (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://billmoyers.com/story/comey-timeline/. 
101 Trump Fires Comey Amid Russian Election Probe, 83 TELECOMM. REP. 24, 24-25 (2017). 
102 ROD J. ROSENSTEIN, OFF. OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., 3915-2017, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967231/download. 
103 Id. 
104 Russell Berman, Mueller Pick Meets a Rare Bipartisan Consensus, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/mueller-pick-achieves-a-rare-bipartisan-
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After the Special Counsel’s Office assumed control of the investigation, Mueller assembled a 
group of renowned prosecutors.106 Trump and his allies frequently attacked the investigation, 
often referring to it as a “witch hunt.”107 At one point, Trump allegedly demanded Mueller’s 
firing, only to back down when White House Counsel Donald McGahn threatened to resign 
rather than ask the DOJ to carry out the directive.108 
Over the course of approximately two years, the Mueller team indicted 34 individuals.109 They 
secured convictions against several members of Trump’s inner circle, including campaign 
manager Paul Manafort and longtime confidant and political strategist Roger Stone.110 As the 
inquiry expanded, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein stated that he would recuse himself 
from overseeing it if his role in Comey’s firing became a point of contention,111 but he never 
did. Mueller’s investigation primarily sought to address two issues: (1) whether members of the 
Trump campaign conspired with Russian operatives to aid in Trump’s election victory and (2) 
whether Trump illegally obstructed the investigation. 
In March 2019, the Special Counsel’s Office concluded its investigation and summarized its 
findings in a voluminous report. The report concluded that Russia had made a concerted effort 
to aid the Trump campaign through a social media misinformation campaign as well as 
“hacking-and-dumping” operations, which involved the release of emails stolen from members 
of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Democratic National Committee.112 
Nevertheless, Mueller and his team concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support 
conspiracy charges against Trump campaign officials,113 although several were convicted at trial 




106 The group included terrorism expert Zainab Ahmad, veteran Supreme Court advocate Michael Dreeban, and the 
chief of the DOJ’s criminal fraud division, Andrew Weissman, among others. Dareh Gregorian, Meet Mueller’s 
Team: The Best Prosecutors in the Business or ‘Angry Democrats’?, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2019, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/meet-mueller-s-team-best-prosecutors-business-or-angry-
democrats-n976226.  
107 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 13, 2019, 12:22 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1149896948507430912.  
108 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When White House 
Counsel Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/politics/trump-
mueller-special-counsel-russia.html.  
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111 Sadie Gurman et al., Special Counsel Mueller’s Investigation Seems to Be Growing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 3, 
2017), https://apnews.com/2fa69c1f399c485e96cc312f7a5039ec. 
112 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9, 36 
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whether Trump committed obstruction of justice,115 but also refused to exonerate him.116 This 
decision was grounded in the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that it would be unconstitutional 
to indict a sitting president.117 
In accordance with DOJ rules, the Special Counsel’s Office submitted its report to Attorney 
General William Barr.118 Two days later, Barr sent a four-page letter to Congress, in which he 
claimed to summarize the report’s contents.119 However, three days later, Mueller wrote a 
letter to Barr asserting that the letter to Congress did not accurately reflect the report’s 
contents.120 Eventually, the DOJ released a redacted copy of the Mueller report to the public.121 
Allegations that Barr misled the public regarding the contents of the report and that redacted 
materials were inappropriately withheld continue to this day.122 
As with prior special prosecutor investigations, the events of the Mueller investigation spurred 
talk of reforming the system.123 Some commentators have criticized Mueller for his refusal to 
make a decision regarding Trump’s conduct and for the manner in which his findings were 
conveyed to the public.124 Even one of the most senior prosecutors in Mueller’s office, Andrew 
Weissmann, voiced criticisms. In a book he wrote about the investigation, Weissmann said 
Mueller’s team should have been more aggressive, such as by subpoenaing Trump for an 
interview and probing Trump’s financial records. He claimed that the decisions to shy away 




115 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1-2 
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116 Id. at 8. 
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118 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (1999). 
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Mueller rejected Weissmann’s critiques, dismissing them as based on “incomplete 
information.”126 
The Mueller report has not established a consensus regarding the Trump campaign’s 
connections to Russia and the president’s role in a possible cover-up. Some use the report as 
proof of misconduct, while Trump claims “Total EXONERATION.”127 
II. Reform Recommendations 
To provide for independent investigations that ameliorate actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest in the DOJ, we recommend restoring a statutory scheme for regulating special counsel 
investigations. Under our proposal, the power to appoint and oversee special counsels would 
be balanced between the attorney general and a special division of the federal judiciary 
consisting of a three-judge panel. This approach would divide the responsibilities pertaining to 
preliminary investigations, appointment, the scope of authority, oversight, removal, 
termination, and release of findings. Congress would have additional checks and oversight 
power. This Part explains each aspect of the proposal, including by drawing on comparisons to 
the past and current approaches to special counsel investigations. Our recommendations are 
divided into seven elements and are summarized as follows:  
1. Pre-Appointment: While the attorney general retains authority and discretion to 
conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether a special counsel is needed, 
our proposed statute provides for more formal recusal standards and checks on inaction 
by the attorney general.   
2. Appointment: The attorney general nominates and the Special Division of the judiciary 
confirms special counsels.  
3. Scope of Authority: The Special Division sets the initial scope of an investigation and 
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4. Oversight: The attorney general maintains primary oversight of the investigation, but 
the attorney general is required to submit reports to Congress whenever he or she 
prevents the special counsel from taking an action.  
5. Removal: The attorney general is authorized to remove a special counsel with approval 
from the Special Division.  
6. Termination: Investigations will have no formal timelines; termination of investigations 
can be triggered either by the special counsel or the attorney general with the Special 
Division’s consent.   
7. Release of Findings: The special counsel must submit a report at the conclusion of his or 
her investigation to the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary 
Committees. The report must include a clear statement as to whether the special 
counsel believes the subjects of the investigation committed crimes, including evidence 
gathered and investigative methods used to reach that determination.  
 Pre-Appointment 
Prior to the appointment of a special counsel, the DOJ has historically conducted a preliminary 
investigation to determine whether a special counsel is necessary. These preliminary 
investigations have typically been spurred by pressure from Congress and the public.  
1. Ethics in Government Act  
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the first stage of a potential independent counsel inquiry 
consisted of a preliminary investigation conducted by the attorney general. The Act required 
the DOJ to conduct such an investigation upon receiving information suggesting that high-level 
executive branch officials may have broken the law.128 The details of the investigation remained 
confidential, but the attorney general was obligated to inform the judges on the Special 
Division of its existence.129 If, after 30 days, the attorney general determined that the 
information was credible, the preliminary investigation would be extended for up to 90 days. 
Based on the conclusions of that investigation and the credibility of the allegation, the attorney 
general was authorized to request that the special division appoint an independent counsel. 
Using information provided by the attorney general, the court would select an independent 




128 BROWN & COLE, supra note 84, at 5.  
129 Id. at 7. 
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2. Current Department of Justice Regulations 
Under the DOJ’s current regulations, a special counsel is appointed by the attorney general, at 
his or her discretion, pursuant to his or her general administrative hiring authority.131 Like the 
prior regime, appointment virtually always takes place after the DOJ conducts a preliminary 
investigation.132 The regulations specify that, in the event of an attorney general’s recusal from 
the matter for a conflict of interest, the deputy attorney general handles appointment and 
oversight.133  
Attorney General Sessions’ recusal from initiating and overseeing the Mueller investigation was 
virtually inescapable under DOJ guidelines,134 given his involvement with the Trump campaign 
and his meetings with the Russian ambassador during the campaign, which he failed to disclose 
during his Senate confirmation hearings.135 But the recusal did not come until a watchdog 
organization filed a complaint with the DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility, and Sessions’ 
subsequent consultation with that office, that he recused himself from the investigation.136 





131 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (1999). See BROWN & COLE, supra note 84, at 8. 
132 See 28 C.F.R. § 600 (1999). 
133 Id. 
134 See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 (1999) (stating that “no employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution 
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has a specific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or 
prosecution.”).  
135 Karoun Demirjian et al., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Will Recuse Himself From Any Probe Related to 2016 
Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/top-gop-
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Were Legally Required, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60757/sessions-recusal-
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3. Recommendation  
Under our proposal, the attorney general would still conduct a preliminary investigation. This 
phase of the investigation should remain in the DOJ’s purview, given the executive branch’s 
constitutional and historic responsibility for originating criminal investigations. But the lack of a 
remedy for inaction under the Ethics in Government Act and the current special counsel 
regulations is problematic. Accordingly, to further the goal of striking a balance between 
independence and accountability while respecting constitutional separation of powers, our 
proposed statute would increase accountability for attorneys general in their decisions to 
recuse themselves from special counsel investigations and to pursue appointments of special 
counsels. 
The proposed statutory scheme would provide more precise standards for determining when 
an attorney general should recuse himself or herself from an investigation. It would formally 
require DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”),138 or another internal DOJ ethics 
entity, to ensure a review is conducted of the attorney general’s potential conflicts of interest. 
OPR would have an affirmative responsibility to continuously review whether an ethics or 
conflict of interest consultation should take place, especially when investigations involve 
certain high-level executive branch officials, such as the president, vice president, and Cabinet 
secretaries. Examples from the American Bar Association Model rules on conflicts of interest, 
including personal conflicts, financial conflicts, material limitations and more, could supplement 
the DOJ’s existing guidelines.139 Following a consultation, OPR could submit a report that makes 
a recommendation as to whether the attorney general’s recusal is necessary. The attorney 
general could decline to recuse himself or herself, but would be required to appear before the 
House or Senate Judiciary Committee to explain the decision.   
We also recommend a mechanism for challenging an attorney general’s refusal to appoint or 
consider appointing a special counsel. Our proposed statute would provide standards that 
trigger an obligation for the attorney general to appoint a special counsel or open a preliminary 
investigation to determine whether appointment of a special counsel is necessary. First, the 
statute would require appointment of a special counsel when certain high-level executive 
branch officials, such as the president, vice president, attorney general, and Cabinet secretaries, 




138 See OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opr (last visited July 14, 
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investigation.140 Second, the statute would allow the chairs and ranking members of the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees to petition the attorney general to initiate an investigation or 
the appointment process. A mix of Democrats and Republicans always hold these positions, 
which would make the petition process viable regardless of which party controlled the White 
House. After a petition’s submission, the attorney general would have 21 days to appoint a 
special counsel or submit an explanation of the decision not to. Even though members of 
Congress could not mandate appointment of a special counsel through this process, it is 
apparent throughout history that public and political pressure is usually the catalyst behind 
special counsel appointments.141 
 Appointment 
The power to appoint a special counsel has alternated between the attorney general and the 
judiciary over the last century.142 Prior to passage of the Ethics in Government Act, special 
prosecutors were not appointed pursuant to any particular statutory authority. Instead, the 
president or attorney general would appoint a special prosecutor at their discretion.143 Perhaps 
the most significant change to special counsel procedures under the Ethics in Government Act 
was the establishment of new mechanisms for appointment of those charged with leading 
independent investigations and prosecutions.144 Virtually all special counsel appointees since 
passage of the Ethics and Government Act have been highly regarded and respected.145 In fact, 
attorneys general have historically selected aggressive special counsels, decisions, which, in 
many cases, may have been motivated by political considerations, such as warding off criticism 
and ensuring that findings that benefit officials are viewed as credible by the public.146   
1. Ethics in Government Act  
The Ethics in Government Act provided for appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate 
and prosecute high-ranking executive branch officials under certain circumstances. The statute 
provided for appointment of “independent counsels” by a three-judge panel, called a “Special 




140 According to the DOJ Handbook, a “subject” is “a person whose conduct is within the scope of a Grand Jury’s 
investigation.” See U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-11000-grand-
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from the preliminary investigation determined whether an independent counsel would be 
appointed, leaving significant discretion to the attorney general. The statute directed the 
attorney general to request an independent counsel appointment where he or she either: (1) 
deemed that further investigation was warranted following the preliminary investigation or (2) 
failed to determine that investigation was not warranted after the passing of the 90-day 
window for the preliminary investigation.148 If the attorney general requested appointment, he 
or she was required to provide the Special Division with sufficient information to assist in 
selecting the independent counsel and defining the investigation’s scope and jurisdiction.149 
The Special Division then had final authority to select the independent counsel.150 
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson held that the judiciary’s role in the 
appointment of an independent counsel was constitutional.151 The Court deemed the 
independent counsel’s role to be one of an “inferior” officer, who reports to a “principal” 
officer (the attorney general).152 Independent counsels’ status as inferior officers, in the Court’s 
analysis, prevented their appointment by the judiciary from violating separation-of-powers 
principles and the constitutional requirement that the president nominate principal officers.153 
Indeed, other special courts with limited powers have been established from time to time.154 
Even after Morrison, there has been significant debate over the constitutionality of legislation 
allowing courts to appoint special counsels. Opponents maintain that judicial appointment is 
barred by the Appointments Clause’s requirement that the president nominate certain 
executive branch officials with the advice and consent of the Senate.155 And although Congress 
may establish executive branch agencies and conduct oversight of those entities, it is prohibited 
from engaging in criminal prosecutions, which fall within the purview of the executive powers 
granted to the president in Article II.156 Accordingly, legislation granting the judiciary the power 
to appoint special counsels may raise concerns of impermissible congressional aggrandizement. 
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legislation calling for judicial appointment provides a meaningful device for checks and balances 
by insulating investigations of executive officials from improper interference from the executive 
branch.157 
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations 
The current DOJ regulations do not involve the federal judiciary; the power to appoint special 
counsels remains with the attorney general. The goal of this aspect of the regulations was to 
shift the balance between independence and accountability more toward accountability in light 
of the concerns about the wide scopes of the Iran-Contra and Whitewater investigations.158 
Under current regulations, appointment is warranted only in the most “extraordinary 
circumstances,” where normal DOJ investigative processes would result in a conflict of interest 
or the public interest would be best served by removing responsibility from the DOJ.159   
The attorney general has almost complete discretion in determining whether and when 
appointment is appropriate, but there are some guidelines as to who can be appointed. A 
special counsel must come from outside of the government and must be a lawyer with a 
reputation for integrity and impartial decision making, along with appropriate experience.160 
The attorney general may appoint a special counsel immediately, conduct a preliminary 
investigation first, or simply attempt to mitigate any conflicts of interest within the DOJ, 
including through recusal of particular individuals.161  
Proponents of the existing regulations might argue that an increased role for the attorney 
general in appointment is needed to prevent out of control investigations. Conversely, 
opponents might argue that in an age of growing politicization of the attorney general position, 
the regulations give a partisan attorney general power to prevent credible investigations into 
political allies. Indeed, as Professor Jed Shugerman asserts, “the twentieth century ushered in 
more partisan insiders, hacks, and fixers, just as the DOJ’s power grew enormously.”162 With no 
statutory right of action or means of judicial review, the power to appoint individuals charged 
with investigating the executive branch rests solely within the executive branch. 
3. Recommendation  
Our proposed statute provides an appointment scheme where the attorney general would 
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three-judge panel appointed by the chief justice of the United States.163 Given the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Morrison, the Special Division’s role in the appointment process should not 
be vulnerable to legal challenges. Subjecting the attorney general’s selection to the Special 
Division’s approval provides a layer of security against appointment of an ill-suited special 
counsel, and promotes both independence and accountability of special counsels. 
If the Special Division rejected a proposed appointee, the attorney general would be allowed to 
propose another candidate. Our recommendation envisions that the special division would give 
broad deference to the attorney general in approving the special counsel nominee, and would 
only reject a nominee upon a clear showing of good cause, such as where the nominee clearly 
lacked requisite experience or had a conflict of interest. 
 Scope 
Defining and controlling the scope of a special counsel investigation presents significant 
challenges related to objectivity, efficiency, and the separation of powers. Kenneth Starr’s 
broad scope during the Whitewater investigation was a significant consideration in Congress’s 
decision to allow the Ethics in Government Act to expire in 1999.164 Although considerable 
deference to the independent counsel proved fatal to the Act, it was initially seen as a 
necessary precaution to prevent a biased attorney general from stunting an investigation. 
President Nixon’s attempt to end the special prosecutor investigation into the Watergate 
scandal and Attorney General Mitchell’s involvement in the scandal made robust discretion for 
the independent counsel seem essential.165 Reform must strike a balance between restraint of 
powers and freedom from interference. 
1. Ethics in Government Act  
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the formal scope of an independent counsel’s jurisdiction 
would be defined by the Special Division of the judiciary at the outset of the investigation.166 
The independent counsel was vested with the power of the entire DOJ other than those powers 
reserved explicitly for the attorney general,167 and the Independent Counsel’s Office was 
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not subject to any budgetary limits.168 With these considerable powers at hand, independent 
counsels were able to undertake wide-ranging investigations.169 
The primary purpose of the Ethics in Government Act’s independent counsel rules was to 
insulate the independent counsel from executive control. Granting the judiciary power to 
define the scope of the investigation, rather than the attorney general, was a crucial step to 
achieving that insulation. A biased attorney general with the power to define scope would be 
able to tailor the scope of an investigation to affect its outcome. Placing this responsibility with 
the judiciary provided an objective check against politicization and supported the perception 
that the investigations were unbiased. The principal objection to this provision was that it 
violated the separation of powers doctrine.170 Many saw the power to define the scope of an 
investigation as a purely executive function and believed the judiciary’s involvement was an 
improper encroachment on the executive branch’s powers. But the Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the law on this basis in Morrison.171 
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations 
The current DOJ regulations let the attorney general determine the special counsel’s 
jurisdiction “with a specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated.”172 The 
regulations also give the special counsel authority to investigate any federal crimes committed 
related to the investigation, such as obstruction of justice.173 A special counsel must receive 
authorization from the attorney general to expand the scope of an investigation beyond its 
original mandate.174  Independent counsels under the Ethics in Government Act had the 
“independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions [] of the 
Department of Justice,”175 whereas special counsels are only vested with the “investigative and 
prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.”176 Although this change has had little 
effect on the formal powers of the special counsel, it denotes a clear shift in the perception of 
the role. By likening the office to “any U.S. Attorney,” the regulation sends a clear message that 
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3. Recommendation 
To protect the scope of investigations from improper influence, we recommend placing the 
authority to define scope with the three-judge panel of the Special Division. At the same time 
that the panel approved the attorney general’s proposed appointee, it would provide the 
special counsel with the initial scope of the investigation. Once the investigation was underway, 
any changes to the formal scope of the investigation would require approval from the Special 
Division. 
Deferring to the judiciary is essential to insulate investigations from political interference, but 
the judiciary’s role should be balanced with input from the attorney general to ensure that the 
investigation proceeds efficiently. Accordingly, the attorney general would still have input over 
what matters fall within the scope of an investigation and what matters may be referred back 
to the DOJ. Allowing the attorney general to retain this power would enable investigations to 
function more smoothly, and it would respect the attorney general’s autonomy. However, if the 
attorney general referred a matter discovered by the special counsel back to the DOJ, he or she 
would need to submit a report to the Special Division explaining the decision. The special 
counsel would also have the ability to refer investigative matters or prosecutions to the DOJ, as 
Mueller often did in his recent investigation, resulting in an additional 14 prosecutions.177 This 
system would allow the attorney general to exercise discretion over a core executive function, 
while providing for review of that discretion. If the Special Division determined that the 
attorney general made an improper decision, it could return the matter in question back to the 
Special Counsel’s Office. Further, issuing reports to the judiciary creates a paper trail of the 
attorney general’s decisions and reasoning, and would incentivize the attorney general to act 
appropriately, if only to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 
In contrast to more overt efforts to undermine an investigation, such as firing the special 
counsel, limiting the scope of an investigation would be a more covert and potentially 
untraceable way to interfere with an investigation. Our recommended reform addresses this 
unique problem by compelling the attorney general to justify such decisions to an independent 
third party or, where necessary, by removing those decisions from his or her discretion entirely. 
However, the attorney general would maintain enough discretion, combined with oversight 
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 Oversight 
The Ethics in Government Act provided for minimal oversight of independent counsel 
investigations. The only meaningful oversight power was the attorney general’s authority to fire 
the independent counsel in a narrow set of circumstances with approval from the Special 
Division.178 The current regulations grant the attorney general more oversight power and 
emphasize that the special counsel is subordinate to the attorney general.179 However, even 
when the attorney general does not tamper in special counsel investigations, the present 
system creates the potential that the public might perceive the investigations as unfair and 
biased.  
1. Ethics in Government Act 
Oversight represented one of the biggest challenges to legislators following the Watergate 
scandal. Congress knew it needed to prevent another incident like the Saturday Night 
Massacre, but some members feared that an office with too much autonomy could lead to 
unrestrained, politically-charged investigations that exceeded their original mandates.180 The 
Ethics in Government Act did not create a completely unfettered independent counsel, but 
there was effectively only one check on the investigations: the attorney general’s ability—with 
approval of the Special Division—to dismiss independent counsels for “good cause” or a 
condition, such as a health problem, that substantially impaired the independent counsel’s 
performance.181 The Act largely succeeded in preventing interference from the executive 
branch, but concerns about excessive autonomy came to be widely held by members of 
Congress. In just two decades, Congress fully reversed its position. It went from fearing the 
executive branch would unjustly interfere with the duties of an independent counsels to 
handing power back to the executive branch to craft rules for the investigations. 
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations 
Under the current DOJ regulations, the special counsel remains subject to all DOJ rules, 
regulations, and procedures and answers directly to the attorney general.182 A special counsel is 
“not subject to day-to-day supervision,” but the attorney general has the right to request an 
explanation for any investigative or procedural step.183 The attorney general can direct the 
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or unwarranted, but the attorney general must report such a decision to Congress.184 These 
provisions provide safeguards against a runaway special counsel while offering some assurance 
that the attorney general cannot divert the course of the investigation without detection by 
Congress. 
3. Recommendation 
We recommend keeping primary oversight of special counsel investigations with the attorney 
general. As the special counsel’s superior and head of the DOJ, the attorney general is in the 
best position to oversee and provide resources to special counsel investigations. Our proposed 
statute would retain the rules for oversight in the current regulations, including the 
requirement that the attorney general report to Congress whenever he or she prevents the 
special counsel from taking an action. There have not been reports of significant interference 
by the attorney general in the investigations conducted under the current regulations. A 
compromised attorney general could certainly affect the course of an investigation by 
tampering with its budget. Accordingly, our proposal would require that the special counsel’s 
budget be periodically reported to Congress, which would put political pressure on the attorney 
general to give the Special Counsel’s Office the resources it needs. 
Congress should not be granted new powers to oversee special counsel investigations. 
Overseeing criminal investigation is within the purview of the executive branch. Additionally, 
leaving oversight to the DOJ helps preserve the confidentiality of investigations; information 
leaks might be more likely with direct congressional involvement. Further, Congress retains its 
own considerable investigative powers, as seen during the Watergate investigation.185 Giving 
Congress oversight of both avenues of investigation could result in duplicative efforts and limit 
the effectiveness of special counsel investigations.  
 Removal 
The procedures for removing special counsels are intensely debated. Traditionally, the 
president has broad discretion to remove officers charged with carrying out the duties of the 
chief executive.186 However, there are obvious concerns that misuse of the removal power 
could prevent meaningful investigations into executive branch officials. As discussed, the 
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prosecutor under the Ethics in Government Act was an inferior rather than a principal officer.188 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court took a functionalist view, reasoning that 
the attorney general’s power to remove an independent counsel and the independent 
counsel’s limited duties, scope of jurisdiction, and tenure indicated that the position was one of 
an inferior officer.189 This meant that an independent counsel could be appointed or removed 
by individuals other than the president under the Appointments Clause.190 Although the Court 
has never overruled Morrison, subsequent decisions have called its validity into question.191 The 
Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the constitutionality of the DOJ’s special counsel 
regulations, but similar challenges may arise under the Appointments Clause and the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
Aside from legal protections, political considerations might provide a powerful deterrent 
against improper removal of a special counsel. In most cases, a special counsel will be selected 
specifically because an investigation is politically contentious. Even if an attorney general could 
fire a special counsel, it might have ruinous political consequences. The optics of removing a 
special counsel investigating high-level executive officers provides the political opponents with 
devastating fodder to inflame public opinion.192 Such a political firestorm occurred after the 
Saturday Night Massacre.193 The incident serves as a reminder to future presidents to refrain 
from similar tactics. Indeed, despite Trump’s frequent attacks, Special Counsel Mueller 
completed his investigation.194 But it is likely that Trump’s frequent use of Twitter to attack 
Mueller was an effort to influence the investigation or galvanize public support in his favor, as 
opposed to Nixon’s more direct approach.195 
As history demonstrates, the power to remove a special counsel must be carefully considered. 
A special counsel who could be easily removed might be ineffective in rooting out government 
corruption and misconduct. Although it is possible that political pressure will deter arbitrary or 
malicious use of the removal power, relying solely on that possibility leaves the special counsel 
in a precarious position. A politically savvy president or attorney general may be able to avoid 
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counsel. On the other hand, the limited removal power under the Ethics in Government Act was 
perhaps the key factor in Congress’ decision to allow the statute to expire.196 An appropriate 
legal mechanism for removal must exist that takes into account the lessons of past 
investigations. The president and, by extension, the executive branch have the responsibility to 
ensure that the “laws be faithfully executed.”197 Accordingly, the executive branch must be able 
to remove an executive branch official who impedes this duty. At the same time, a special 
counsel must be able to carry out investigations without improper interference. 
1. Ethics in Government Act 
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the attorney general could remove an independent 
counsel for “good cause.”198 If the attorney general chose to do so, he or she would have to 
notify the Special Division as well as the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress, 
providing the reasons for removal. If removed, an independent counsel could challenge the 
decision in court for failing to meet the “good cause” requirement.199 
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations 
Current DOJ guidelines resemble the Ethics in Government Act provisions on removal in many 
ways, but there are several notable differences. An attorney general still must show “good 
cause” to remove a special counsel.200 Unlike the Ethics in Government Act, the regulations 
provide examples of “good cause,” such as “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict 
of interest” or violating department policy.201 While the attorney general must provide 
Congress with an explanation of his or her decision, the regulations do not envision judicial 
review of removal decisions. It is possible that a politically motivated attorney general could 
bypass the good cause requirement by rescinding the special counsel regulations. The attorney 
general has this power because the regulations were promulgated under the attorney general’s 
authority and, therefore, are subject to change at his or her discretion.202 In such a scenario, a 
special counsel likely would not have grounds to challenge a termination decision in court. 
3. Recommendation 
Removal procedures must comply with the ambiguous standards set by the Supreme Court. 
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separation of powers because a special prosecutor is an inferior officer.203 While Morrison has 
been criticized in the years since it was decided, it has never been overruled.204 Our 
recommendations assume that Morrison is still good law, notwithstanding some speculation 
that the current Court may view the issue differently than in years past.205 
The attorney general should retain the authority to remove a special counsel for cause. As the 
supervisor of the special counsel’s work, the attorney general is in the best position to judge 
whether there is good cause for removal. Special counsels should receive the protection of a 
“good cause” removal standard because the nature of their investigations might pressure an 
attorney general to remove them for reasons other than their performance. “Good cause” 
removal is appropriate to ensure that the conflicts of interest that necessitated the 
appointment of a special counsel cannot influence the investigation. This standard properly 
strikes a balance between protecting the integrity of investigations and allowing for the 
removal of a special counsel who fails to fulfill the office’s duties. 
The attorney general’s authority to remove a special counsel should also be conditioned upon 
approval from the Special Division of the judiciary responsible for appointment.206 To remove a 
special counsel, the attorney general would petition the panel with the grounds for removal. 
The Special Division would then determine if the reasons offered for dismissal satisfied the 
good cause standard. If the Special Division agreed that removal was justified, the special 
counsel’s removal would be effective and the attorney general could nominate a new special 
counsel subject to the Special Division’s approval. This design remedies one of the primary 
flaws with the current regulations: the lack of a way to challenge an attorney general’s removal 
decision. By requiring an attorney general to preemptively justify his or her decision, this 
provision would prevent pretextual claims of good cause from prevailing. Importantly, this 
process preserves the autonomy of the attorney general when removal is warranted. Involving 
the judiciary would also hopefully alleviate political backlash against an attorney general who 
made a valid removal decision in the midst of a divisive investigation. 
Although it is unorthodox to subject an attorney general’s dismissal of a subordinate to court 
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would violate the principle of separation of powers by allowing the courts some control over 
law enforcement, a traditionally executive function.207 However, Morrison already rejected this 
argument as it pertained to the Ethics and Government Act.208 The only difference between our 
proposed removal process and the scheme that Morrison approved is the requirement of 
preemptive court approval of a removal decision. This difference should not change the legal 
analysis because the attorney general would still have control over the decision; the Special 
Division would only review it to ensure that there was good cause. Court approval is required 
for certain law enforcement actions. Local police must seek a court approved warrant before 
conducting searches of an individual’s property and the DOJ must convince the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court that FBI surveillance in certain cases is appropriate before any 
surveillance can begin.209 In a case where the impartiality of the DOJ is questioned, calling upon 
another branch to safeguard the veracity of the process is prudent. Undoubtedly, the 
independence of each branch is vitally important, but the Supreme Court does not require that 
the branches operate in complete isolation from each other.210 To create a workable system of 
government, sometimes the roles of the various branches must overlap. 
Supreme Court precedent since Morrison is also consistent with these changes. In Edmond v. 
United States,211 the Court took a more formalistic view of analysis under the Appointments 
Clause than it had in Morrison. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s view that an inferior officer is 
someone supervised by a principal officer is consistent with the special counsel system.212 The 
attorney general continues to supervise the special counsel throughout the process. Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board does not present any problems 
for the proposal either.213 There, the Court invalidated an agency design that guarded both an 
inferior officer and their supervisors with for cause protections.214 There is only one level of for 
cause protection in this design, considering that the president can remove the attorney general 
at will.215 Thus, the “[m]atryoshka doll of tenure protections” that the Court feared is 
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 Termination 
It is critical to have clear procedures for ending special counsel investigations. Without 
transparency and accountability, investigations might come to an end prematurely. 
1. Ethics in Government Act 
Under the Ethics in Government Act, the independent counsel or the Special Division could 
terminate an investigation.217 If the independent counsel triggered the termination, he or she 
was required to notify the attorney general that the investigation was complete.218 The Special 
Division could terminate an investigation when it determined that the investigation was 
sufficient or at a stage where the DOJ could complete it through traditional channels.219 The 
Special Division could terminate the investigation in response to a recommendation from the 
attorney general.220   
The Ethics in Government Act’s termination procedures protected against both interference by 
the executive branch and runaway independent counsel investigations. By permitting the 
attorney general to recommend termination, the process allowed the executive branch to end 
investigations, as long as the Special Division agreed that it was justified. Procedures for 
terminating independent counsel investigations without the consent of the impendent counsel 
provided protection against limitless and unrestrained investigations. 
2. Current Department of Justice Regulations  
Under the current DOJ regulations, the attorney general and the special counsel have the 
authority to terminate investigations.221 There is no established timeline for a special counsel 
investigation’s length, but a special counsel is required to annually report the status of his or 
her investigation and send budget requests to the attorney general.222 Upon review, the 
attorney general can decide whether an investigation should continue and whether the budget 
requested is appropriate.223 Under this system, decisions made by the attorney general 
regarding the termination of an investigation may go unchecked, and the attorney general 
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3. Recommendation 
We recommend using the Ethics in Government Act’s approach to termination. Termination of 
an investigation should be triggered either by the special counsel or by the attorney general 
with consent from the Special Division. The Special Division would give the attorney general 
deference in his or her decision, and would withhold approval only in extreme cases, such as 
where there is evidence that the attorney general’s decision is attempting to obstruct the 
investigation. Investigations should not have formal timelines or end dates. While there is a 
legitimate concern about runaway investigations and their expense, timelines and end dates 
could encourage obstruction from witnesses or those under investigation, who may attempt to 
run out the clock on an investigation rather than cooperate.  
 Release of Findings 
Special counsels have typically prepared reports summarizing their offices’ work and the 
findings of their investigations. It is critical that the release of findings proceeds smoothly and 
that the reports are concise and comprehensible to foster public trust. Both the Ethics in 
Government Act and the current DOJ regulations capture parts of what is necessary concerning 
the release of findings, but neither has proven wholly effective. 
1. Ethics in Government Act 
Under the Ethics in Government Act, at the termination of an investigation, the independent 
counsel was mandated to complete a report and submit it to the Special Division.224 The report 
detailed the independent counsel’s work throughout the investigation, including descriptions of 
any prosecutions the office brought.225 Additionally, the Ethics in Government Act directed the 
independent counsel to “advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible 
information which such independent counsel receives, in carrying out the independent 
counsel’s responsibilities under this chapter, that may constitute grounds for an 
impeachment.”226 Independent Counsel Starr provided his report regarding President Clinton to 
Congress under the latter provision.227 Critics asserted that the report went into excessive 
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2. Current Department of Justice Regulations  
Under the current DOJ regulations, a special counsel is required to submit a report to the 
attorney general at the conclusion of the investigation.229 This report is confidential, and the 
regulations do not provide for its disclosure to the public. The report must detail the special 
counsel’s reasoning for decisions made and methods used throughout the investigation, as well 
as any prosecutorial decisions.230 After receiving the special counsel’s report, the attorney 
general is required to send his or her own report to the chairs and ranking members of the 
Senate and House Judiciary Committees.231 The attorney general’s report must include “an 
explanation for each action” taken and detail any alleged misconduct by the special counsel. 232   
The regulations do not mandate that the DOJ publicly disclose any information about the 
special counsel’s findings or any version of the report to members of Congress. However, the 
regulations do provide that the attorney general may release the report if he or she deems 
doing so to be in the public interest.233 The regulations provide the attorney general discretion 
to keep the report from Congress and the public when necessary, such as when it includes 
information about sensitive matters of national security, foreign relations, or ongoing 
investigations. However, the expansive control that the attorney general retains might be 
subject to abuse. Even members of Congress may never receive the special counsel’s full 
report—only the attorney general’s abbreviated summary. This process allows for the 
possibility of deliberate mischaracterizations of a special counsel’s findings. For example, 
Attorney General Barr’s handling of the Mueller report faced criticism for obscuring and 
misrepresenting the substance of Mueller’s findings.234 
3. Recommendation 
A special counsel should submit a report on the investigation directly to Congress, namely the 
chairs and ranking members of both chambers’ judiciary committees, without the attorney 
general’s involvement. This would allow the special counsel’s findings and conclusions to reach 
a bipartisan group of lawmakers, who are in a position to act on information in the report if 
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Given that the attorney general would not oversee the release of information about special 
counsel investigations, it is imperative to set clear standards for reporting to ensure both 
fairness and propriety. Accordingly, the report should focus only on federal crimes that the 
special counsel uncovered. The report should include clear statements of what crimes the 
special counsel concluded were committed, including by the president. While Special Counsel 
Mueller believed he was prohibited from making such a pronouncement about the president 
due to the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that asserts that the president is immune from 
criminal indictment while in office, we believe that a clear statement on criminality is 
permissible and necessary. Though this raises questions of fairness due to the president’s 
inability to present a defense in court, the statement does not deprive the president of his or 
her liberty. Additionally, the president has a unique and extremely prominent platform to 
defend himself or herself.236 Finally, the special counsel’s report should include an executive 
summary containing key findings and conclusions. This summary must be clear, concise, and 
comprehensible, but should consist of narrative detail of the investigation, going beyond a 
general statement. This will allow Congress and the public at large (if it is released to them), to 
understand the key takeaways of the investigations. 
III. Conclusion 
To create a fair and effective system for investigating the executive branch, the rules for special 
counsel regulations must balance independence and accountability. While prosecutorial and 
law enforcement responsibilities have traditionally fallen within the purview of the executive 
branch, there are times when those powers must be shared with other branches to ensure 
impartial investigations of certain government officials. Accordingly, our recommendations seek 
to address that balance by dividing power and decision-making between the attorney general 
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